报告主题：Benefiting from Bias

报告人：高 鑫

主持人：宋华盛

时  间：2019年12月12日星期四 15:00―16:30

地  点：玉泉校区永利集团304am登录418

Abstract: A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. The agent does not initially observe this state, but he can learn about it by privately experimenting, at a cost. We characterize the principal's optimal delegation set. This set has a cap to restrict the agent's bias, but it may have a hole around safe decisions in order to encourage information acquisition. Unlike in standard delegation models, the principal's payoff is maximized when the agent's bias is nonzero. 

高 鑫：德国曼汉姆大学经济学博士，剑桥大学博士后，研究方向为微观理论，信息经济学和机制设计。