Seminar: Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets
发布日期： 2019-01-02 来源：dwjl 
1489
1489 时间：2019年1月11日（周五）下午三点至五点
地点：玉泉校区永利集团304am登录418会议室
主讲人：Nicola Pavanini副教授，荷兰蒂尔堡大学
主持人：潘士远 教授
题目：Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets
摘要：We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric information. We estimate a structural model of firms’ credit demand for secured and unsecured loans, banks’ contract offering and pricing, and firm default using detailed credit registry data in a setting where asymmetric information problems in credit markets are pervasive. We provide evidence that collateral mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard. With counterfactual experiments, we quantify how an adverse shock to collateral values propagates to credit supply, credit allocation, interest rates, default, and bank profits and how the severity of adverse selection influences this propagation.
主讲人介绍：Dr.Nicola Pavanini，荷兰蒂尔堡大学金融学副教授。他拥有意大利帕多瓦大学经济学学士、意大利威尼斯大学经济学硕士、英国华威大学经济学硕士及经济学博士学位。目前研究重点是实证产业组织、应用结构计量经济学和实证银行，曾在American Economic Review、 Journal of the European Economic Association等国际报刊杂志多次发表论文。
